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The Polish public support for integration
with the European Union
The beginning of the process of the systemic transformation was
accompanied by the slogan: „return to Europe”. Soon after, the idea
gained more substance in the postulate of Poland’s integration with the
European structures (initially the EEC, and then the EU). As early as in
February 1994, the Association Agreement between Poland and EC,
signed in December 1991, entered into force. Just thirteen years later, on 
the 1 May 2004 – 6 years after the beginning of the accession
negotiations – Poland became a member of the European Union.
The idea of Poland’s accession to the European Union was met with
a very positive attitude of the society already in the beginning of 1990s,
at the time of its appearance in the public discourse. The public support
for Poland’s entry to the EU then reached 80%. This exceptionally high
support weakened during the next years, yet still the majority of the
Polish society supported Poland’s membership in this organization.
Undoubtedly, among the reasons for the public support for the idea of
European integration were the unambiguously pro-integrationist policy
of all successive governments of the III Polish Republic as well as
a general support for integration of the majority of social and political
elites. The EU membership was recognized as one of the Polish
politically strategic goals following from the Polish nationanl interest.
The extent of the influence of the unambiguously pro-integrationist
policy of successive government cabinets can be illustrated by the lack
of sharp difference in the support for the EU membership among people
with left- or right-wing political inclinations.
The stabilization of the support was assisted by the presence of
a conviction about this process being inevitable and having no
alternative. A vast majority of the society saw the EU membership not
just as a choice, but as an inevitability resulting from the advanced
globalization processes – deepening of mutual political and economic
dependences and connections between different countries. There was
a common feeling that there was no coming back from Poland’s
membership in the EU. Remaining out of the EU was accompanied
with no less anxiety as accessing the EU, but certainly lacked the hope
granted by the prospect of the membership in the community.
In the pre-acc ession pe riod the support for the EU we aken ed, but it
was also be com ing much more con scious. If in the be ginn ing it was
ba sed on the ge ner al expectat ions for a civi lis ati onal and cul tur al
ad vanc eme nt of Po land and swift jo ining the com mun ity of the
We stern co unt ries, in time this support was ga ining a more sub stant ive
ba sis. The awar ene ss of the ad justm ent pro blems con nect ed with
in teg rati on as well as the civi lis ati onal di stance be tween Po land and
EU mem ber sta tes was in crea sing. Mo reo ver, the expectat ions
as soc iated with Po land ’s mem bersh ip in the EU be came more
ba lanc ed– the expect ed be nef its were con sid ered in a more long-term
per spect ive, with an as sumpt ion that only the next ge ner ati on of Po les
will be nef it from them to the ful lest.
Poles entered the EU with a mixture of hopes and anxieties, not sure
of what would happen after 1 May 2004. On the one hand, they hoped
for the acceleration of the economic development and drop of
unemployment rate (which reached 20% in 2002), on the other, they
were afraid of the rise of prices and thus the worsening of living
standards. Such worries began to increase dramatically in the course of 
the last few months before the referendum. Nevertheless, the vast
majority of the voters (77,45%) supported Poland’s membership in this 
organization. Such considerable support in the referendum was
possible on the one hand, due to the pro-integrationist attitudes which
have become more consolidated. On the other hand, many
Eurosceptics were convinced that it was pointless to oppose what was
inevitable, and just did not turn up at the polling stations.
After the accession of Poland to the European Union Poles were
relieved to see that the dark scenarios, assuming the failure of the
economy as a result of EU integration, had not fulfilled, and that no
dramatic changes had taken place in our country. The diminished
uncertainty and reduced fears associated with the EU membership, and 
the following increasingly visible positive effects led to the greater
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support for the EU in the first few months after the accession. Two years
after the accession the percentage of the supporters of the EU
membership is considerably bigger than that from just before the
accession. 80% of Poles declare themselves as the supporters of the
Poland’s membership in the EU, whereas only 11% are opponents. This
means that the public support for the EU membership today is the
highest for the past 10 years.
As fol lows from the Eu rob aro met er re sea rch, Po les’ sa tis fa ction with 
our co unt ry’s mem bersh ip in the EU is hi gher than the ave rage in the
EU. Among the new mem ber co unt ries only Li thua nia has a hi gher
support.
Weighing benefits and losses
 Con sol ida tion of the pu blic support for Po land ’s mem bersh ip in the
EU re sults pre dom ina ntly from the fact that the be nef its of acc ession are
gra dua lly be com ing more vi sib le with the pas sage of time. Just three
mon ths be fore the acc ession, in Fe brua ry 2004, the num ber of pe op le
be lieving that the acc ession will bring about more los ses than be nef its
was al most the same as that of pe op le be lieving in more be nef its than
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Picture 1. Attitude towards integration among all respondents
So u r ce: CBOS.
los ses. First at tempts at as sessment of the mem bersh ip three mon ths
after the acc ession were better than the expectat ions express ed earl ier.
In the next mon ths the num ber of pe op le se eing more be nef its than
los ses of our EU mem bersh ip was ri sing. Three mon ths after Po land ’s
acc ession to the Eu rop ean Union two in five Po les were convin ced that
the mem bersh ip brought more be nef its than los ses, whe reas to day –
after two years of mem bersh ip – this opin ion is shar ed by more than
half of the po pul ati on.
At the same time, the percentage of people negatively evaluating the 
membership effects was diminishing. Two years after Poland’s
membership in the European Union, the number of people convinced
that the EU integration brings more benefits than losses to our country
is almost three times bigger than the number of people believing the
contrary.
Yet, although more than half of Poles see positive effects of the EU
membership for our country, considerably less people declare that they 
personally perceive benefits of the integration. Notwithstanding this,
the attitudes in this regard are becoming more positive. 2 years after the 
accession, the percentage of people declaring that the EU membership
brought them personally more benefits than losses is almost twice as
big as the number of people rather suffering from its negative effects.
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Picture 2. Integration with the European Union (will bring) brings Poland:
So u r ce: CBOS.
Socio-economic effects of the integration
The EU accession boosted the economic growth in Poland. The first
year of membership was already regarded as beneficial for the Polish
economy. 2 years after the EU accession the positive economic effects
became even more visible. Now more than half of the Polish society
sees the positive influence on the state of the Polish economy (57%, 10
points more than a year ago). The evaluation of the economic effects of
the membership is varied for different sectors of the economy. Contrary
to earlier opinions, the sector which in the public view benefited most is
the agricultural sector due to the EU system of agricultural direct
subsidies.
An increasing number of people see the positive effect of
integration for the functioning of business, both private and public.
Yet, it does not change the fact that in the public opinion it is rather
private companies (47%) that benefit from the EU membership than
the public ones (32%).
Moreover, although already a year after the EU accession Poles
noticed a positive effect of integration on the economy, they did not see
positive changes on the labour market. Today, the number of people
seeing improvement in this area is increasing. Nevertheless, the opinion
that the integration has no influence on unemployment still prevails.
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Picture 3. Integration with the European Union (will bring) brings you
personally:
So u r ce: CBOS.
Unhappy about the high level of unemployment in Poland, Poles
strongly value the opening of the labour markets by some of the EU
member states. They consider this opportunity as one of the most
important benefits of the EU membership. About a year after the EU
accession, one in seven Poles declared that after the 1 May 2004
somebody from their closest family left for one of the EU countries to
work there. According to polls (as well as the official statistics) the
most popular destination for economic migration was Germany, where 
Poles were predominantly employed in seasonal jobs. The second most 
popular country was Great Britain. Poles are employed there in
administration, marketing, hotel business and gastronomy. Relatively
many Poles work in Italy, Ireland and the Netherlands. According to
the statements of migrants’ families, the bulk of Poles who have
migrated to the EU member states, are legally employed. Yet, the
majority of persons interested in economic migration to one of the EU
member states declared their readiness to work there illegally.
The gradual improvement of the state of economy, as well as the
fading away of bad connotations associated with EU because of the
rise of prices shortly after the accession result in more positive
perception of the effect of the integration on the material situation of
Poles. If a year ago the dominant opinion was that integration had
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Picture 4. Do you think that as a result of Poland’s accession to the EU the 
unemployment in Poland has rather increased, has rather decreased, or the
integration has had no influence on that?*
So u r ce: CBOS.
* Un til Fe bru a ry 2004 the qu e stion con ce r ned the ex pe c ta tions as so cia ted with the
EU ac ces sion.
a negative impact on the living conditions of Poles, presently it is just
the contrary. More people notice the positive rather than negative
effects of the integration on material living conditions.
Before the accession to the EU many people expressed fears
regarding the level of preparation of Poland for the membership and for
the EU funds’ absorption. Many feared that because of the
government’s indolence or too complicated procedures and too high
demands from the EU, Poland would not be able to use the structural
funds and other EU assistance monies. According to the Ministry for
Regional Development, Poland has spent only 11% of the money
granted for 2004–2006. Local governments and the business managed
to absorb the largest amount of money. It is expected that the
simplification of the procedures of granting the EU funds should result
in the ability to spend 40% of the granted money. Despite the low
absorption capacity so far, structural funds considerably boosted the
GDP growth, as well as – even if it is not so visible yet – contributed to
the decrease of unemployment in Poland. The flow of money from the
EU funds is also better noticed by an average Pole. More people see
changes in their environment associated with the absorption of the EU
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Picture 5. Do you think that Poland’s accession to the EU influenced
the material living conditions of Poles rather positively, rather negatively, or 
it has had no influence on that?*
So u r ce: CBOS.
* Un til Fe bru a ry 2004 the qu e stion con ce r ned the ex pe c ta tion as so cia tion with the EU 
ac ces sion.
funds – the development of municipal investment, e.g. a sewage
system. Yet, the most common example of investment co-financed by
the EU funds is the building and repair of roads, as well as building of
motorways.
Civilisational and cultural effects of the integration
Even if socio-economic effects of the integration can be noticed
within a relatively short period of time, one may expect that its
civilisational and cultural consequences will only be seen in the future,
as a result of long-term processes. Nevertheless, more and more people
see the influence of the EU integration in this sphere as well. What is
more, the awareness of the civilisational-cultural effects of the EU
integration strongly shape the attitude of Poles towards the integration.
More than a half of the population see positive effects of the integration
for the natural environment in Poland. Almost half of Poles consider that 
the EU membership contributed to better state of knowledge and level of 
education as well as better attitude towards work. Two in five Poles
notice the rise of work efficiency after joining this organization. More
than four in ten Poles see the positive effect of the EU membership on
the functioning of the political system in Poland, rule of law, as well as
the cultural life of Poles. There is a widely held opinion that the EU
membership has not caused considerable changes in the areas
fundamental for the Polish national identity: the Polish religiosity and
patriotism. Yet, a slightly bigger number of people (22%) than from
a year ago, mention the diminishing of the stability of the Polish family.
More often than a year ago, Poles notice the integration’s influence upon 
interpersonal relations – benevolence and tolerance for others.
When comparing the auto-stereotype of a Pole and a stereotyped
perception of an average EU citizen, it can be seen that we evaluate
ourselves better and better and feel increasingly similar to Western
Europeans. The success of the first year after the accession has boosted 
the self-esteem of Poles. A year after the EU accession almost one in
two, and now two in five Poles believe that after joining the EU the
self-esteem of Poles has improved. This is also and important factor in
consolidation of the public support for the integration.
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Socio-demographic differentiation of the assessment
of EU integration results
Pu blic at tit udes to wards the in teg rati on have al ways de pend ed on the 
re spond ent’s so cio-econ omic sta tus, as de fin ed by educ ati on and
in come as well as the ru ral/urban divi de. Strong support for the EU as
well as opti mism as to the fu ture effects of the in teg rati on were
as soc iated with hi gher level of educ ati on, re lat ively high in come, good
eva lua tion of own ma ter ial si tua tion, living in a big city as well as
non-agric ultu ral so urc es of in come. The se in terd epe nden ces are still
via ble. The gre atest suppor ters of the EU in teg rati on are pe op le with
hi gher educ ati on, pe op le in ma nag eri al po sit ions, spe cial ists and priva te 
en trep rene urs. The se gro ups eva lua te the pre sent effects of the Po land ’s
mem bersh ip in the EU better than the ave rage. Age is also an im port ant
fac tor. You ng pe op le, espec ially pu pils and stu dents, be long to the
gro ups which shows the hi ghest appre ciat ion ofr the po sit ive effects of
the in teg rati on (more than 90%).
Farmers are the group whose attitudes evolved in an interesting way.
For many years scepticism and opposition towards European
integration were characteristic of this group, and fears associated with
its effects were the most common. In the beginning of 2004, just several
months before the EU accession, opinion polls showed that a dominant
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Picture 6. Do you think that as a result of Poland’s EU accession
the self-esteem of Poles has rather increased, has rather decreased
or the integration has had no influence on that?
So u r ce: CBOS.
opposition towards integration among farmers. The majority of them
were afraid that the EU accession would have a negative effect on their
farms. However, farmers’ attitudes to the EU membership improved
considerably in the first months after the accession. Supporters of the
EU membership among them outnumbered the opponents. One of the
factors of this change, often ignored in different sorts of forecasts of the 
effects of the EU integration, was the increased demand for certain
agricultural products. The increased demand for Polish products
surprised farmers, especially taking into account that they had been
afraid that trade liberalisation would lead to flooding Poland with
foreign agricultural products. Yet, first of all, the rise in support for the
EU membership among farmers was connected with the hopes to
receive direct subsidies for agricultural products. Two years after
joining the EU, farmers’ opinions about the effects of the EU
integration for themselves are still evolving. The support for the
membership in this groups is not as high as it was shortly after the
accession, although it remains higher than it was before the accession
(up to 60%). Farmers complain about the drop in purchase prices for
agricultural products, rise in prices on means of agricultural
production, too high standards on milk products. Although the
subsidies are an unquestionable asset of the EU membership, yet in the
opinions of some farmers, these subsidies are too low, procedures too
complicated and waiting time too long.
The po sit ion of Po land in the Eu rop ean Union
and the per cei ved at tit ude of other mem bers
of the EU to wards Po land
In the public perception one of the vital positive effects of the EU
membership is the improvement of the position of Poland in Europe.
The increased significance of Poland in Europe after the accession to
the EU is noticed by 60% of Poles. Just after joining the EU in June
2004 there were just slightly more people who considered our country
to have medium position and influence than those that saw Poland
among the least significant countries. At present, Poles much more
commonly place Poland among the countries of medium position.
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These changes were accompanied by the perception of improved
attitudes of other EU states towards Poland. Two years ago, Poles were
convinced that the two biggest states of the EU, France and Germany,
are not welcoming towards Poland’s aspirations to play a more
significant role in Europe. Both these countries were considered as
unfriendly towards Poland. Such opinions were triggered by
disagreements over the Constitutional Treaty as well as the Iraq
intervention. In both questions Poland’s position (similarly to the
position of Spain under the premiership of Aznar) was different than
that of France and Germany. What we in Poland defined as
independence in foreign policy, some of our EU partners interpreted as
lack of loyalty and overgrown ambitions. Poles had an impression then
that their country was not treated as an equal partner and that it was
allowed less than the core 15 countries. Nevertheless, the growing
scepticism towards the Iraq intervention, suspension of the constitution
ratification process, the change of governments in Spain and Germany,
the positions of the main EU countries in the budget negotiations as well 
as general satisfaction with the effects of the EU membership
contributed to the change in the Polish perceptions of these countries. At 
present time, Poles find it difficult to indicate our allies in an
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Picture 7. How do you assess Poland’s position in the European Union?
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unambiguous way, yet, no countries are perceived as obvious
adversaries. More often than other countries, Polish respondents
choose Germany as our ally. This shows that the basis for good
Polish-German relations formed during Helmut Kohl’s chancellorship
was strong enough to ensure good relations despite difference in
opinions regarding EU policy as well as recurring historical debates.
However, in spite of the improving assessment of the integration
results and more universal personal experience of its positive effects,
the opinion that the old members benefit from the EU enlargement
more than Poland is still dominant.
In Po les’ opin ion the gre atest be nef ici aries of the EU en larg eme nt
are the bi ggest and most im port ant EU Mem ber Sta tes: Ger many,
Fran ce and Gre at Bri tain. In July last year only 8% of Po les be lieved
that Po land was among the co unt ries be nef iti ng most from the EU
mem bersh ip. It is wor th no ting that Po les’ opin ions re gard ing the
be nef ici aries from the EU mem bersh ip do not ma tch with the
per cept ions of re spond ents from other EU co unt ries. The
Eu rob aro met er su rvey from the last year shows that the Irish per cei ve
be nef its the stron gest (87%), and then the in hab ita nts of Lu xemb urg
(72%), Li thua nia (72%), and Den mark (70%). The sa tis fa ction from
the effects of the mem bersh ip is also express ed by the in hab ita nts of
the new mem ber sta tes with the excep tion of Cy prus, inc lud ing Po les
(62%). The preva lence of the po sit ive ra ther than ne gat ive effects of
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Picture 8. The EU accession
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the EU mem bersh ip is also cle ar in Fran ce (53%). Re spond ents from
Ger many and Gre at Bri tain, ho wever, who are in dic ated by Po les as the
gre atest be nef ici aries of the EU mem bersh ip, be lieve that they do not
re ally be nef it from it (43% and 42% acc ordi ngly).
Preferences regarding the model of European
integration
The focus of debates and political cleavages in Poland is shifting
from support for our membership to the questions of the future shape of
this organization. All significant political forces and their electorates in
Poland now accept EU membership, even those who opposed it two
years ago.
Poles have always agreed that the EU should be, first of all, an
economic community. Satisfaction from the present effects of Poland’s
membership in the Community contributes to the consolidation of
support for the economic dimension of integration. Economic unity with 
Europe is supported by 80% of Poles. Yet, the support for political,
axiological and cultural dimensions of integration grows much slower.
More than half of Poles (54%) support Poland’s unification with the EU
on the level of political structures, and half believe that integration
should also concern people’s values and life goals. It is still a common
opinion that our country should keep distinctiveness in the sphere of
culture and traditions. The cultural dimension of integration is
supported only by one in four Poles.
Most Poles believe that the need for the future EU enlargement
warrant the necessity of institutional changes towards deeper
integration of the EU member states. At the same time, Poles also
believe that no country should be excluded from this process. For this
reason, they reject the development of  “the hard-core” or “two-speeds
Europe”. The majority of Poles (57%) believe that it would be bad if
there formed a group of countries cooperating closer than the rest in the
EU. If, nevertheless, such a group was formed, Poland should join it
(75%), in order avoid marginalization.
Considerable support is given to the formation of supranational
political and military structures in the EU. More than half of Poles
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support the establishment of the office of Minister for foreign affairs as 
well as the creation of army units under the common command.
Almost half of Poles believe that there should be an institution
functioning as a common government in the EU. However, the idea of
establishing the office of the EU president is met with rather negative
reactions.
Table 1.
Yes No Dif fi cult to say
In your opi nion, sho uld the
EU have:
III
‘03
VII
‘03
IV
‘06*
III
‘03
VII
‘03
IV
‘06
III
‘03
VII
‘03
IV
‘06
% 
– An in sti tu tion fun c tio ning 
as a com mon go ve r n ment 52 47 49 23 29 39 25 24 12
– Pre si dent 39 32 33 34 41 53 27 26 14
– Army units un der the
com mon com mand 44 52 51 32 26 37 24 22 12
– Mi ni ster for com mon
fo re ign po li cy – 45 52 – 29 35 – 26 13
* III, VII 2003 – the CBOS data, IV 2006 – the In sti tu te of Pu b lic Af fa irs data.
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Although Poles see the necessity of closer cooperation in the unified
EU, they are afraid of the vision of the EU as a super-state. The majority
(56%) support a model of the EU which assumes that member states
should maintain the largest possible scope of sovereignty. Yet, it is also
worth noting that today more Poles support deeper integration, and
believe that Europe should be headed in the direction of a federal state
similar to the United States of America. Such a vision is supported today 
by one in four Poles. The federalist model is most commonly supported
by pupils and students (48%) and generally by young people – between
18 and 34 – (37%) as well as businessmen (44%).
The focus on the necessity to preserve state sovereignty in the EU
structures as well as a negative attitude towards deep integration may
follow from the fact that Poles are afraid of the EU being dominated by
the European biggest and strongest states. Although the majority
believe that harmonious reconcilement of national interests and the EU
interests is possible, they also think that so far national egoisms have
won over the common good. The conviction that Europe lacks solidarity 
and thinking in categories of common good may be supported by such
facts as: some countries are still afraid to open their labour markets for
the citizens of the new member states, farmers cannot use the benefits of
the Common Agricultural Policy to the fullest, and the richer countries
are not very willing to share their money with poorer countries, trying to
pay as little as possible to the common cash-box.
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62%
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12%
Picture 10. Do you believe that UE member states are primarily concerned with:
So u r ce: CBOS.
Opinions regarding the European Constitution
A majority of Poles has always supported the ratification of the
Constitutional Treaty. This fact demonstrates their understanding of
the necessity of establishing legal basis for closer cooperation between
member states. Public support for the European Constitution has been
dominant despite reservations towards some of its provisions,
especially those regarding the new voting procedures in the EU
Council. Under the influence of the uncompromising position of a part
of Polish political elites, Poles supported preserving the Nice system of 
voting, which they considered to be more beneficial for Poland.
However, they also believed that blocking the agreement on the
constitution may have long term negative political and economic
consequences for Poland.
Despite the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the French and
Dutch referendums, a majority of Poles believes that the EU needs
a constitution.
In their opinion, the Treaty is vital for effective functioning of the
EU (59%), including “tidying up” of legislation (51%). Constitution is
also believed vital for the interest of the Community inhabitants (49%). 
Poles are skeptical about the chances of ratification of the
Constitutional Treaty in its present shape, after its previous rejection
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Picture 11. Does the European Union need a Constitution or rather not?
So u r ce: In sti tu te of Pu b lic Af fa irs.
by the French and Dutch people. The dominant opinion is that it is
necessary to write a new constitution (44%).
Final Remarks
Polish attitudes towards the European Union are characterized by
certain duality. On the one hand, the vast majority of Poles support
Poland’s membership in the EU and assess the accession effects
increasingly well. On the other hand, deeply rooted distrust not only
towards the EU, but also towards the biggest EU states and their motives 
can be observed. We can hope that the growing satisfaction with the
membership effects, the improving position of Poland and Poles in
Europe, as well as a feeling that Poland plays the role according to its
aspirations will contribute to the growth of trust towards our partners
and support for deeper European integration. It seems unlikely that the
new government coalition will negatively influence the pro-European
attitudes of the general public. Although the elites have shaped Poles’
attitudes towards European issues for some time, there is also an
opposite process, whereby the public opinion influences the attitudes of
political parties. The evolution of the League of Polish Families and
Samoobrona (Self-defence) – parties which opposed the integration or
were deeply skeptical about it before the accession, and now support
Poland’s membership in the EU, can serve as a good example.
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